The main contention of this book is that the British hid their use of naked force behind a carefully constructed veneer of legality. But this was a serious distortion of actual British practice on the ground. By using only the minimum necessary force, and doing so with the utmost discrimination, the British were able to win by securing the 'hearts and minds' of the people. Many observers believed that during their wars of decolonisation in the two decades after 1945 the British had discovered how western liberal notions of right and wrong could be made compatible with the imperatives of waging war amongst the people, that force could be used effectively but with care, and that a more just and prosperous society could emerge from these struggles. Over the next decade these claims unravelled spectacularly in Iraq and Afghanistan, and this book suggests that one reason for that was because contemporary British counter-insurgency doctrine was based upon a serious mis-reading of the past. 'The experience of numerous small wars has provided the British Army with a unique insight into this demanding form of conflict.' (Ministry of Defence, 2001). Finally, external pressures imposed procedural reforms on the detention and interrogation regime, but failed to stop abuses. Inspections consistently found abuse centred around the interrogation facility. Thirdly, once ICRC visits were forced on Aden, officials learned to live with them. Secondly, the push for outside interference in detention and interrogation immediately generated animosity between Whitehall and the High Commission. Firstly, detention and interrogation in Aden are contextualized within British counter-insurgency as a whole. This article focuses on relations between the High Commission in Aden, Whitehall departments, Amnesty International, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, asking how far these two external organizations managed to uncover detention and interrogation practices, and how officials in Aden responded to the scrutiny. Colonial officials often complained about outside meddling in their campaign to defeat the insurgency in the South Arabian Federation from 1963 to 1967.

Insurgency outpost